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All phase-encoded BB84 implementations have signal states with unbalanced amplitudes in prac-
tice. Thus, the original security analyses a priori do not apply to them. Previous security proofs use
signal tagging of multi-photon pulses to recover the behaviour of regular BB84. This is overly conser-
vative, as for unbalanced signals, the photon-number splitting attack does not leak full information
to Eve. In this work, we exploit the flag-state squashing model to preserve some parts of the multi-
photon generated private information in our analysis. Using a numerical proof technique, we obtain
significantly higher key rates compared with previously published results in the low-loss regime. It
turns out that the usual scenario of untrusted dark counts runs into conceptual difficulties in some pa-
rameter regime. Thus, we discuss the trusted dark count scenario in this paper as well. We also report
a gain in key rates when part of the total loss is known to be induced by a trusted device. We highlight
that all these key rate improvements can be achieved without modification of the experimental setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
The earliest phase-encoding quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) scheme was proposed by Bennett [1] in 1992
as a demonstration that any two non-orthogonal states
can be used for generating shared secret keys between
two parties. Later, Townsend [2] and then Hughes et
al. [3] proposed a more practical phase-encoding BB84
protocol which uses two Mach-Zehnder interferome-
ters. In practice, the phase-modulator in each Mach-
Zehnder unit will introduce photon loss, thereby caus-
ing an asymmetry between the intensities of the phase-
encoded pulse and the reference pulse even if the typi-
cal observations do not directly reveal this. This asym-
metric loss was addressed in Refs. [4–6] which model
the loss caused by an imperfect phase-modulator with a
beam splitter (BS) of the same transmission probability.
The first attempt in giving security proofs for this pro-
tocol was made by Ref. [4]. Formal security proofs were
later on provided by Refs. [5, 6] which both used qubit-
based reduction proof techniques. Despite being a devi-
ation from the standard BB84 protocol, Ref. [6] confirms
that the old security analysis for the balanced protocol
still holds in the unbalanced case. This calls for a revi-
sion of the security statement made by Ref. [5], which
we will discuss in detail in Sec. VI.
Both Refs. [5] and [6] use decoy states [7–9], signal
tagging [10, 11], and the qubit squashing model [10, 12–
14] to convert the full security analysis into an effec-
tive qubit-to-qubit security analysis problem. Due to the
asymmetric intensities of the signal states, the photon
number splitting (PNS) attack [15] will not leak full in-
formation of the signal’s multi-photon part to Eve since
in this case, a single photon obtained in the PNS attack
will be in one of two non-orthogonal states, even af-
ter basis announcements. Thus, the tagging approach,
which pessimistically assumes that all multi-photon sig-
nals leak their full information to an adversary, simpli-
fies the security proof but underestimates the secure key
rate of this protocol.
In this paper, we will answer the following questions:
Could we improve the key rates in Ref. [6] if we keep
the multi-photon part of the signals? Could the multi-
photon part of the signal contribute significantly to key
rates when the total loss or the asymmetry is large?
To highlight the differences between our approach
and Refs. [5, 6]’s, we apply the numerical analy-
sis formulated in [16] which involves optimisations
over finite-dimensional matrices to obtain reliable lower
bounds on the key rates. On the source side, we treat
lower photon numbers explicitly, while turning to tag-
ging again for higher photon numbers. On the receiver
side, we know that the qubit squashing model converts
the multi-click events caused by the multi-photon part
of the signals into additional qubit errors [5, 13, 14]. The
convenience of reaching a qubit picture may thus cost a
reduction in key rate. Therefore, we use the flag-state
squashing model [17] to circumvent this problem, es-
pecially for low-loss channels. The flag-state squash-
ing model preserves any measurement on a low photon-
number subspace, while tagging the arriving signals of
higher photon numbers. As a result, we obtain secret
key rates that can exceed the ones quoted in Refs. [5, 6].
During our investigations, we noticed a problem with
the common approach which attributes all observed er-
rors to an adversary and describes Bob’s detection de-
vice by an idealised set-up. Once the actual detectors
have some dark count rate, this approach may lead in
some circumstances to unphysical constraints, meaning
that such an ideal device could not lead to the actual
observations. For that reason, we will also introduce re-
sults for trusted detector noises, especially dark counts,
for which this problem does not exist.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. We first
revisit the protocol in Sec. II and describe the mathemat-
ical model of the protocol in Sec. III. We will then justify
our security proof techniques and state the methods that
allow us to speed up our key rate computations in Sec.
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2IV. With the description of how we simulate experimen-
tal statistics in Sec. V, we present our lower bounds for
the secure key rates of the protocol in Sec. VI. A sum-
mary of our results is provided in Sec. VII to conclude
this paper. Full justifications of the proof techniques
mentioned in Sec. IV are discussed in the Appendices.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We consider a phase-encoded BB84 protocol with a
Mach-Zehnder set-up. The only modification is that we
take into account the typical loss in one arm of the inter-
ferometer, which results from the insertion loss of phase
modulators. This asymmetric loss leads to an unbalance
of the amplitudes of the two generated pulses as illus-
trated in Fig. 1. We describe here the general outline
of the protocol structure. Since we are dealing with the
asymptotic key rate in this article, we omit any detail
that would be relevant only for a finite-size analysis of
the protocol.
FIG. 1. The setup for the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84 pro-
tocol. All beam splitters (BSs) are labelled by their transmissiv-
ities. The grouping of Bob’s detection events are represented
by the dotted boxes.
1. State preparation: Alice prepares a phase-
randomised coherent state with mean photon
number |α|2 where α ∈ C and chooses a random
phase φx from the set {0, pi2 ,pi, 3pi2 } with equal
probabilities in each round. Alice also sends a
small portion of decoy coherent states with differ-
ent mean photon numbers {|αi|2 : ∀αi ∈ C}i∈N.
2. Measurement: Once Bob receives the signal state,
he chooses a random phase φB from the set {0, pi2 }
with equal probabilities and records all events
coming from the two detectors at any of the three
time slots. A click is termed “outside” if it is not in
the 2nd (middle) time slot.
3. Testing: After repeating steps 1 & 2 for many times,
Alice and Bob jointly announce a random subset
of their data (including events coming from decoy
states) and decide whether they should abort or
proceed with the rest of the protocol.
4. Announcement, sifting and post-selection: For each
round, Alice announces the basis to be “even” if
she picks her phase from {0,pi} or she announces
“odd” if her phase is in {pi2 , 3pi2 }. Bob announces
“even” if he picks φB = 0 or “odd” if φB = pi2 .
In addition to basis announcements, Bob also an-
nounces “discard” for events that have only out-
side clicks or no click. Alice keeps the φx’s only for
the rounds where Bob did not announce ”discard”
and where her bases match with Bob’s. Bob keeps
a detection event if his basis matches Alice’s and
the event is not to be discarded.
5. Direct reconciliation key map: Alice maps φ(j)x in the
j-th kept rounds to the j-th bit zj of the raw key as
zj =
{
0, if φ(j)x = 0,pi/2,
1, if φ(j)x = pi, 3pi/2.
(1)
6. Error correction and privacy amplification: Alice and
Bob perform standard error correction so that Bob
also obtains a copy of the key map register. They
then proceed with a privacy amplification protocol
to obtain a shared secret key.
We point out that our method generalises to any
asymmetric basis choice (i.e. probabilities of choosing
“even” and “odd” bases are not equal). It was shown
in Ref. [18] that the probability of choosing one basis
can be set arbitrarily close to 1 without affecting the
asymptotic security analysis. Note that the formalism
described here would also allow one to consider the re-
verse reconciliation approach, where in step 5 of the pro-
tocol Bob performs a key map instead of Alice. Then,
Alice and Bob would have to swap their respective roles
in step 6.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE PROTOCOL
A. Optical Models
We start by identifying two equivalent optical mod-
els for the Mach-Zehnder component that appears in
both Alice’s and Bob’s apparatus. The descriptions for
the two models are illustrated in Fig. 2. Instead of
having the loss in one arm of the interferometer, the
equivalent model places a loss element in front of the
Mach-Zehnder component, which then has an asym-
metric beam splitter at the entry [5].
This replacement picture tells us that Alice’s loss can
be absorbed into the rescaled amplitude of the incoming
single laser pulse, whereas Bob’s loss can be absorbed
into the channel’s action.
3FIG. 2. Equivalence relationship between a lossy phase modu-
lator in the encoding device and an uneven BS with transmis-
sivity 12ξ followed by another uneven BS with transmissivity ξ
and a perfect phase modulator, where ξ = 11+κ [5].
B. State preparation
We use the source-replacement scheme [19, 20]
to represent a prepare-and-measure scheme with an
entanglement-based scheme. Since Alice’s signal state
is mixed, we will introduce a purifying “shield” system
that will be left behind in the source so that the exist-
ing source-replacement framework can be applied. We
will provide a detailed description of the entangled pure
state prepared by Alice below.
To prepare the output signal state, Alice’s laser first
creates a phase-randomised coherent state
σin(2α) =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|2αeiθ〉〈2αeiθ | =
∞
∑
n=0
pn(2α)|n〉〈n|,
(2)
where pn(β) = e−|β|
2 |β|2n
n! is the Poissonian distribution
in photon number n. She then sends it through her en-
coding device set at a phase φx which outputs a time-bin
signal with two modes,
σx(α) =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|ψx(α)〉〈ψx(α)|, (3)
where |ψx(α)〉 = |αeiθ ,
√
κ αei(θ−φx)〉.
In the following steps, we will express the state σx(α)
in a two-mode Fock basis {|sxn(ξ)〉} which is defined
later in Eqn. (8). Let a˜ †1 and a˜
†
2 be the creation operators
of the two output time modes of the signal. We define
a rescaled amplitude α˜ := α
√
1+ κ = α/
√
ξ with the
definition ξ := 11+κ and a new mode creation operator
a˜ † :=
1
α˜
(αeiθ a˜ †1 +
√
κ αei(θ−φx) a˜ †2 ) (4)
=
eiθ√
1+ κ
(a˜ †1 +
√
κ αe−iφx a˜ †2 ) (5)
= eiθ(
√
ξ a˜ †1 +
√
1− ξ e−iφx a˜ †2 ). (6)
We define a set of two-mode Fock states for n ∈N as
|sxn(ξ)〉 =
1√
n!
(a˜ †)n|0〉 (7)
=
n
∑
k=0
√(
n
k
)
ξ
n−k
2 (1− ξ) k2 e−ikφx |n− k, k〉. (8)
The state |ψx(α)〉 can be rewritten in the new basis as
|ψx(α)〉 = e−
|α˜|2
2
∞
∑
n=0
α˜ n
n!
(a˜ †)n|0〉 = e− |α˜|
2
2
∞
∑
n=0
α˜ n√
n!
|sxn(ξ)〉
(9)
which is a coherent state with amplitude α˜. The phase-
randomised signal state is therefore a Poissonian mix-
ture of the new Fock states as in
σx(α) =
∞
∑
n=0
pn(α˜)|sxn(ξ)〉〈sxn(ξ)|. (10)
Since the signal state σx(α) is mixed, Alice can purify
the state by introducing an ancillary system AS such that
the following is a pure state
|σx(α)〉AS A′ =
∞
∑
n=0
√
pn(α˜) |n〉AS ⊗ |sxn(ξ)〉A′ , (11)
where the register A′ is the signal system. Note that the
probability pn(α˜) is independent of Alice’s choice x.
We can thus summarise the source description as Al-
ice preparing an entangled pure state
|Ψ〉AAS A′ =∑
x
√
px |x〉A ⊗ |σx(α)〉AS A′ , (12)
where {|x〉A}x=0,...,3 is an orthonormal basis of Alice’s
register A for x corresponding to the phase φx = pi2 x
and px = 14 for all x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Note that registers A
and AS are private to Alice, and Eve only has access to
the signal system A′. We call the purifying system AS a
“shield” system for it to be inaccessible to Eve (i.e. Eve
only gets the mixed state σx(α) but not the pure state
|σx(α)〉AS A′ ).
C. Measurements
In the prepare-and-measure scheme, the action of
Alice randomly choosing the phase φx in the signal
state is equivalent to a measurement on |Ψ〉AAS A′ with
POVM {|x〉〈x|A}x=0,...,3. Alice’s measurement can be
performed before or after Bob performs his measure-
ment.
We start out by describing the POVM of Bob’s mea-
surement assuming ideal devices, especially without
dark counts of the detectors. We will later on derive the
POVM of devices with specified dark counts. To charac-
terise all of Bob’s possible measurement outcomes, we
construct his POVM using the creation and annihilation
operators for six optical modes arriving at 3 different
time slots and at 2 detectors. Ignoring global phases,
the six annihilation operators of a fixed phase φB, which
correspond to the six “click” locations depicted in Fig. 1,
4are
b1 = b4 →
√
ξ
2
a1 , (13)
b2,φB →
√
1− ξ
2
a1 − eiφB
√
ξ
2
a2 , (14)
b3 = b6 →
√
1− ξ
2
a2 , (15)
b5,φB →
√
1− ξ
2
a1 + eiφB
√
ξ
2
a2 , (16)
where a1 and a2 are annihilation operators of the two
incoming time modes of the signal.
Since b1 = b4 and b3 = b6, the POVM elements corre-
sponding to click events at 1 and 4 (3 and 6) are the same.
Hence, each pair can be combined into a single time-
mode annihilation operator. The corresponding opera-
tors for the two pairs are
bt1 →
√
ξ a1 , bt3 →
√
1− ξ a2 (17)
where t1 and t3 denote the 1st and 3rd time slots in Fig 1.
This is equivalent to coarse-grain the outside-only click
POVM elements and outcome probabilities but without
losing information about the relative phase, φx − φB.
This reduces the redundancy in constraints for the op-
timisation which will be described in Sec. IV C.
As Bob’s measurement outcomes consist of all com-
binations of click events at different time slots, detec-
tors, and basis choices, his POVM elements are obtained
by summing weighted projectors of all possible states
that could lead to a particular click pattern. Based on
the fact that Bob uses threshold detectors for detection,
all POVM elements are block-diagonal in total photon
number basis [12, 13].
These allow the construction of Bob’s POVM elements
in terms of the modes impinging on the detectors by
first restricting to the n-total photon subspace of Bob’s
entire system, and defining the following operators cor-
responding to different click events:
• no-click: (for n = 0)
FφB0 = p(φB)|0〉〈0|, (18)
• single-click: (for n ≥ 1)
Fn,φBi1 = p(φB)
1
n!
(b†i1)
n|0〉〈0|bni1 , (19)
• double-click: (for n ≥ 2)
Fn,φBi1,i2 = p(φB)
n−1
∑
k=1
(b†i1)
n−k(b†i2)
k|0〉〈0|bn−ki1 bki2
(n− k)! k! , (20)
• triple-click: (for n ≥ 3)
Fn,φBi1,i2,i3 = p(φB)
n−2
∑
k=1
n−k−1
∑
j=1
|β3(n, j, k)〉〈β3(n, j, k)| (21)
with |β3(n, j, k)〉 =
(b†i1
)n−k−j(b†i2 )
k(b†i3
)j |0〉√
(n−k−j)! k! j! ,
• all-click: (for n ≥ 4)
Fn,φBac = p(φB)
n−3
∑
k=1
n−k−2
∑
j=1
n−k−j−1
∑
l=1
|β4(n, j, k, l)〉〈β4(n, j, k, l)|
(22)
with |β4(n, j, k, l)〉 =
(b†i1
)n−k−j−l(b†i2 )
k(b†i3
)j(b†i4
)l |0〉√
(n−k−j−l)! k! j! l! ,
where p(φB) is the probability of choosing the phase φB
and b†iµ ∈ {b†t1 , b†2,φB , b†5,φB , b†t3} are the mode creation op-
erators for a fixed phase φB, with b†iµ 6= b†iν for all µ 6= ν
and µ, ν ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We can express Bob’s POVM el-
ements in terms of the incoming modes, a1 and a2, by
substituting the final modes with Eqns. (14) – (17).
To obtain Bob’s POVM elements for the full Hilbert
space, one simply sums over all contributions from all
photon number subspaces to get
Fk =
∞
∑
n=0
Fnk , (23)
where k labels the 16 possible click patterns (Bob’s mea-
surement outcomes) and the two measurement bases.
For n to be less than the minimum photon number to
trigger the click event k, Fnk is a zero operator. If k is the
no-click event, Fnk is a zero operator for all n ≥ 1.
To reduce the number of linearly dependent POVM
elements for better numerical performance in calcu-
lating key rates [21], we combine the pairs of φB-
independent POVM elements of the two measurement
bases into one by summing the two elements together.
This reduces the cardinality of Bob’s POVM from 32 to
28 since the following 4 click patterns: no-click, t1-only,
t3-only, and t1&t3 are basis-independent.
In a trusted dark-count scenario where dark counts
are not controlled by Eve, we incorporate the effect of
dark counts into Bob’s POVM by applying a classical
post-processing map, P , on Bob’s POVM elements {Fk}.
The output of the map is a new POVM {Pk}with each el-
ement corresponding to a linear combination of the orig-
inal POVM such that Pk = ∑i Pk,i Fi where Pk,i are the
matrix elements of the linear map P . We illustrate the
action of the map P with the new POVM elements in
Eqns. (A3)-(A9). Since the map P acts the same on all
photon-number subspaces, it also holds that
Pnk =∑
i
Pk,i Fni . (24)
The map P models the effect of dark counts as a classi-
cal noise in the sense that for each detector and at each
detection time window, a no-click event flips to a click
event with probability, pd. We can recover Bob’s dark-
count free POVM {Fk} by setting the dark-count proba-
bility pd = 0 in the case with untrusted dark counts.
5Overall, we obtain the joint POVM of Alice’s and
Bob’s measurements {|x〉〈x|A ⊗ Pk} where x ∈ {0, ..., 3}
and k ∈ {1, ..., 28} since Bob has 28 coarse-grained out-
comes in total if no-click is included.
IV. SECURITY PROOF TECHNIQUES
A. Flag-state squashing model
In order to numerically compute the secure key rate,
we need to reduce the dimension of Bob’s state from in-
finite to finite so that numerical SDP solvers can be used.
Since Bob uses threshold detectors, his POVM elements
are block-diagonal, so the qubit squashing model [5, 12–
14] can be applied. However, by reassigning the multi-
click events to single-click events randomly, the squash-
ing model introduces additional qubit errors to the orig-
inal data. Instead, the flag-state squashing model [17] is
used here to circumvent this problem.
We set a finite photon-number cutoff NB and define
the (n ≤ NB)- and (n > NB)-photon subspaces to be
two Hilbert spaces containing Fock states of at most NB
and at least NB + 1 photons respectively. The flag-state
squashing map Λ first projects Bob’s state ρ onto the
two subspaces. It then applies an identity map to the
projected state ρn≤NB and measures the projected state
ρn>NB with the POVM {Pk} to give the squashed state
Λ(ρ) =
(
ρn≤NB 0
0 ∑k Tr(Pk ρn>NB)|k〉〈k|
)
. (25)
Bob’s corresponding flag-state squashed POVM ele-
ments are
P˜k =
(
NB
∑
n=0
Pnk
)
⊕ |k〉〈k|, (26)
where NB is a finite-number photon cutoff and k labels
Bob’s detection events. The joint POVM of Alice’s and
Bob’s measurements in the flag-state squashing model
is {|x〉〈x|A ⊗ P˜k} where x ∈ {0, ..., 3} and k ∈ {1, ..., 28}.
Since the measurement channel acting on the (n >
NB)-photon subspace is entanglement breaking [22],
one needs to lower bound Tr(Πn≤NB ρ) with Bob’s mea-
surement statistics to ensure that some entanglement
between Alice and Bob is preserved in order for them
to establish a secret key [20]. For trusted dark counts,
we show in Appendix A that the lower bound for the
weight of the (n ≤ NB)-photon signal subspace condi-
tioned on Alice choosing signal x is given by
p(n ≤ NB|x) ≥ 1− p(cc|x)− p(cc|0)pmin(cc|NB + 1)− p(cc|0) , (27)
p(cc|0) = 1− (1− pd)2[1+ pd(1− pd)2(2− pd)], (28)
pmin(cc|n) = 1− (1− pd)2ξn − (1− pd)4(1− ξ)n, (29)
where the conditional cross-click probability, p(cc|x), is
the sum of the observed probabilities of all events ex-
cluding no-click events, events with clicks only in time
slot t2 (inside-only), and events with clicks only in time
slots t1, t3 (outside-only) given that Alice picks signal x.
We also show in Appendix A that the bound in (27) is
always tighter than the dark-count free bound (pd = 0)
derived by Narashimhachar [14], so we could also ob-
tain a lower bound of the secure key rate using that
dark-count free bound. For untrusted dark counts, one
simply has to use that bound.
B. Decoy state & key rate decomposition
In this article, we prove the security of the protocol
against any collective attack. Since the signal states and
measurements are permutation invariant between dif-
ferent rounds, the quantum de Finetti theorem [23] or
the postselection technique [24] can be applied to uplift
our security statement to the security against coherent
attacks, which will both lead to the same asymptotic key
rate. From that we obtain a composable e-security proof
[25] of the protocol under Eve’s general attacks with the
same asymptotic key rate as under the collective attack.
Let R be the key register held by Alice in direct rec-
onciliation, E be Eve’s quantum and classical register, B
be Bob’s quantum register, B and B˜ be Bob’s classical
registers for his measurement outcomes and announce-
ments respectively. The Devetak-Winter formula [26] for
asymptotic secure key rate can be expressed as
R∞ = ppass[min
ρ∈S
H(R|E)− H(R|B)], (30)
where ppass is the probability of passing the sifting and
post-selection steps, S is the set of all density matrices
that satisfy Alice’s and Bob’s joint statistics.
The key rate formula (30) can be converted into an al-
ternative form, as shown in Refs. [16, 27], using the rel-
ative entropy
R∞ = min
ρAAS B∈S
D(G(ρAASB)||Z(G(ρAASB)))− ppass δEC ,
(31)
where G and Z are two maps that will be discussed be-
low. The formula includes a privacy amplification (PA)
term as the first term and an error correction term δEC =
fEC H(R|B) with a heuristic classical error-correction ef-
ficiency factor fEC ≥ 1.
The G map is a completely positive trace non-
increasing map capturing the effects of sifting, post-
selection and announcement on Alice’s and Bob’s joint
state, which takes the form [16, 28]
G(ρ) =∑
i
Ki ρ K†i (32)
with the Kraus operators of this protocol defined as
K0 = (|0〉R ⊗ |0〉〈0|A + |1〉R ⊗ |2〉〈2|A)⊗F B0 ⊗ |0〉B˜ ,
(33)
6K1 = (|0〉R ⊗ |1〉〈1|A + |1〉R ⊗ |3〉〈3|A)⊗F B1 ⊗ |1〉B˜ ,
(34)
where {|0〉B˜, |1〉B˜} is Bob’s basis announcement bit,
F Bj =
√
∑b∈K Fb,φB= pi2 j and K denotes Bob’s post-
selected outcomes. The Z map captures the effect of the
key map, and is given by
Z(σRC) =
1
∑
j=0
(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1C) σRC (|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1C) (35)
with register C encapsulates all registers except R.
Since Alice is sending a Poissonian mixture of Fock
states, Eve can, in principle, perform a QND measure-
ment on Alice’s signal to learn its photon number with-
out disturbing the signal itself. We show in Appendix
B that as a direct consequence of this the state ρAASB
is block-diagonal in Alice’s output photon number n˜.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we can restrict the
minimisation in Eqn. (31) to be taken over a smaller set
S′ = {ρAASB = ∑∞n˜=0 pn˜ |n˜〉〈n˜|AS ⊗ ρn˜AB : ρAASB ∈ S}
where {ρn˜AB} are the normalised states conditioned on
Alice sending out n˜ photons. This allows one to split the
PA term into a probabilistic combination of PA terms as-
sociated with different n˜ as in
R∞ = min
ρAAS B∈S′
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ D(G(ρn˜AB)||Z(G(ρn˜AB)))− ppass δEC .
(36)
See Appendix B for the proof of the decomposition.
For our analysis, we assume a decoy-state scenario
[7–9], which means that in addition to the usual signal
states, Alice prepares also decoy states that are repre-
sented by dephased laser pulses with different intensity
levels |αi|2. More precisely, we assume for simplicity
the infinite-decoy scenario, where a countably infinite
number of decoy intensities are used so that a decoy
data analysis can reveal to Alice and Bob the conditional
probabilities of any observable, where the condition is
with respect to Alice’s output photon number n˜.
These conditional probabilities constrain the feasible
set of normalised states Sn˜ for each of Alice’s output
photon number n˜ independently, which further restricts
the minimisation in Eqn. (36) to be taken over a smaller
set S′′ = {ρAASB = ∑∞n˜=0 pn˜ |n˜〉〈n˜|AS ⊗ ρn˜AB : ρAASB ∈ S,
ρn˜AB ∈ Sn˜ ∀ n˜ ∈N} ⊂ S′. Given that the probability dis-
tribution {pn˜}n˜∈N is fixed by the intensity of the signal,
the minimisation over S′′ can be pulled into the sum-
mation and split into minimisations over individual Sn˜,
resulting in the following key rate formula
R∞ =
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ min
ρn˜AB∈Sn˜
D(G(ρn˜AB)||Z(G(ρn˜AB)))− ppass δEC .
(37)
We remark that the inclusion of a finite number of de-
coy states would be a natural extension of this work, in
which case the description of each set Sn˜ would depend
on other sets {Sn′ : n′ 6= n˜}. Hence, a more careful treat-
ment of the PA term would be needed.
The major benefit of breaking down the PA term into
individual minimisations is to avoid the need of keep-
ing the infinite-dimensional shield system AS in the ar-
gument of the optimisation as seen in Eqn. (31). Instead
of optimising over the set of infinite-dimensional states,
we convert our problem into an infinite number of opti-
misations with finite-dimensional arguments.
Notice that when Alice sends out vacuum (0 photons),
Eve learns nothing about Alice’s choice x, so each key
bit z ∈ {0, 1} is equally likely to Eve, which implies
that H(R|E) = H(R) = 1. Therefore, the first term in
the summation in Eqn. (37) is equal to pn˜=0pass which is
the contribution from Alice sending out vacuum to the
probability of passing sifting and post-selection.
By Klein’s inequality, quantum relative entropy is
non-negative for all positive semidefinite matrices (i.e.
D(A||B) ≥ 0 if A, B ≥ 0 and Tr(A) ≥ Tr(B) [29]), so
D(G(ρn˜AB)||Z(G(ρn˜AB))) ≥ 0 ∀ n˜ ∈ N. Thus, omitting
any terms in the summation will only reduce the to-
tal value on the right-hand side of Eqn. (37). In fact,
omitting an n˜-photon term is the same as treating all
n˜-photon output signals as being tagged for which the
encoded state is fully known to Eve. Since we can only
optimise a finite number of terms in the infinite sum, we
can truncate the infinite sum at n˜ = NA where NA is
a positive finite integer to obtain a lower bound for the
key rate. The choice of NA = 1 corresponds to the tag-
ging as used in Refs. [5, 6]. We then have the key rate
expression as
R∞ ≥ pn˜=0pass +
NA
∑
n˜=1
pn min
ρn˜AB∈Sn˜
D(G(ρn˜AB)||Z(G(ρn˜AB)))− ppass δEC .
(38)
This allows us to reduce the number of finite-
dimensional optimisations from infinity to a finite num-
ber that corresponds to the computational resources
available to us.
C. The SDP problem
To optimise individual PA terms in Eqn. (38), the pri-
mal SDP problem is formulated as
minimise D(G(ρn˜AB)||Z(G(ρn˜AB)))
subject to
Tr[(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ P˜k) ρn˜AB] = p(x, k|n˜),
Tr[(|x〉〈x|A ⊗Πn≤NB) ρn˜AB] ≥ p(x) pminn≤NB |x ,
TrB(ρn˜AB) =
1
pn
TrAS A′ [(|n˜〉〈n˜|AS ⊗ 1A′) |Ψ〉〈Ψ|AAS A′ ],
Tr(ρn˜AB) = 1,
ρn˜AB ≥ 0. (39)
7The first line in the constraints demands the shared
state ρn˜AB conditioned on Alice sending out n˜ photons
to satisfy Alice’s and Bob’s joint measurement outcome
probabilities conditioned on n photons in the received
signal, which are obtained from the infinite-decoy anal-
ysis. The second line lower bounds the weight of ρn˜AB in
the (n ≤ NB)-photon subspace by Eqn. (27). The third
line demands that Alice’s reduced density matrix is un-
changed. The last two lines ensure that ρn˜AB is a valid,
normalised density matrix.
D. Implementation of numerical security analysis
Following the procedure in Ref. [16], suboptimal solu-
tions of the primal SDP problems in the form of (39) for
1 ≤ n˜ ≤ NA are obtained numerically using the MAT-
LAB optimisation package CVX and the Frank-Wolfe al-
gorithm. These suboptimal solutions infer the upper
bound for the individual privacy amplification terms in
Eqn. (38). A linearisation of each of the primal problems
at their suboptimal solution is then converted into a dual
SDP problem. Using the CVX numerical solver again,
the dual suboptimal solutions for 1 ≤ n˜ ≤ NA provide a
reliable lower bound on the whole privacy amplification
term.
Solving the primal optimisation problem is computa-
tionally demanding in terms of time and memory even
if the flag-state squashing model is applied to reduce the
dimension of the matrix variables ρn˜AB. One can further
utilise the structure of the flag-state squashed state as
described in Eqn. (25) to reduce the number of complex
variables in the allowed matrices ρn˜AB. Bob’s flag-state
squashed POVM elements also enable us to split mul-
tiplications between constraint matrices and the state
variable ρn˜AB. In addition, the objective function of the
SDP problem in (39) can be evaluated much faster if
the computation is restricted only to the non-zero sub-
spaces in the images of the maps G and Z . With these
three techniques, we managed to reduce the compu-
tation time of the primal optimisation by a significant
amount. See Appendix C for the technical details.
We utilise the fact that the SDP problem specified in
(39) is independent of the mean photon number |α|2
of Alice’s phase-randomised coherent state because the
minimisations in Eqn. (37) are over each set Sn˜ sepa-
rately. In other words, the choice of |α|2 only affects
the photon number distribution {pn˜} and the error-
correction term δEC in the key rate formula (38). There-
fore, we can maximise the key rate lower bound over
the signal intensity |α|2 efficiently once we have the dual
suboptimal solutions as the error-correction term can
be directly calculated from the observables of the cor-
responding simulation.
V. SIMULATION OF EXPERIMENTS
In the absence of experimental data, we have to per-
form a simulation of an experiment to obtain realistic
probability distributions which replace the experimen-
tal data as input of our security analysis. Note that the
details of the simulation model are independent of the
actual security proof.
A. Channel simulations & detection efficiency
We simulate the quantum channel between Alice and
Bob with a loss-only channel which is essentially an un-
even beam splitter. We also assume that both detectors
of Bob have equal detection efficiency ηdet, where each
detector can be modelled as a beam splitter with a trans-
mission rate ηdet followed by an ideal detector. In this
simple model, a single parameter η which we call the
total transmissivity describes the combined loss caused
by the following three effects: the inefficiency in the pro-
cess of coupling the signal light to the optical fibre, the
absorption and scattering processes of light in transmis-
sion through the fibre, and the detection efficiency of
Bob’s threshold detectors.
We also investigate the case where we assume the de-
tection efficiency ηdet to be outside of Eve’s control, as
a trusted, characterized loss element of the receiver. In
that case, we keep the beam splitter with transmissiv-
ity ηdet in Bob’s apparatus, which in turn modifies the
POVM elements described in Sec. III C. Bob’s POVM
with known detection efficiency can be obtained with a
similar approach used in Ref. [17].
B. Dark counts
To simulate our statistics when dark counts are
present, we generate the outcome probabilities with
Bob’s classically post-processed POVM described in Sec.
III C and Appendix A, which is associated with a dark-
count probability, pd, for each detector and at each de-
tection time window.
If dark counts are assumed to be trusted in the sense
that they are not in Eve’s control, we use the classically
post-processed flag-state POVM {P˜k} as the constraint
matrices in the SDP problem (39) to calculate the pri-
vacy amplification term. This approach guarantees the
SDP problem to be feasible since measurement probabil-
ities correspond directly to a quantum state in the simu-
lation.
However, if we consider untrusted dark counts, that
is, if we pessimistically attribute the effect of dark count
noise to Eve, the flag-state POVM of dark-count free de-
tectors is used as the SDP constraint matrices instead.
Note that unlike the existence of a physical model for
pulling out the equal detection efficiency into the chan-
nel, this approach is not covered by any physical equiv-
8alence model that allows one to outsource the dark
counts to Eve. Therefore, it is possible that no quantum
states could have led to the classically post-processed
statistics if the measurement is assumed to be dark-
count free. In that case, the SDP problem becomes in-
feasible due to unphysical constraints. This is what we
encounter in some parameter regime of our calculation,
as we will point out in the next section.
VI. KEY RATES
Before diving into our main results, we start by stat-
ing the parameters used throughout this section. We
set Bob’s flag-state photon number cutoff to be NB = 4
so that the SDP optimisations can be solved within a
reasonable amount of time. The maximum number of
terms kept in the PA summation in Eqn. (38) is set to
be NA = 3 since we observe that the key rate in the low-
loss regime does not improve even if we keep more than
3 terms. Furthermore, we set the dark count probability
to be pd = 8.5× 10−7 and the error-correction efficiency
to be fEC = 1.22 as quoted in Ref. [30].
In Fig. 3(a), we present lower bounds for the secure
key rates per clock cycle corresponding to different val-
ues of the phase-modulator transmissivity κ and the to-
tal transmissivity η in the two scenarios with trusted
and untrusted dark counts. The total transmissivity η
captures both the transmission efficiency of the loss-
only channel and the detection efficiency of Bob’s detec-
tors. We obtain these bounds by maximising the lower
bounds for key rates over the mean photon number |α|2
as specified in Sec. IV D. The optimal |α|2 for each point
in Fig. 3(a) are shown in Fig. 3(b).
Let us expand on the SDP infeasibility issue with un-
trusted dark counts mentioned in Sec. V B. In the high-
loss regime where the total transmissivity η ≤ 0.2, the
SDP problem for some parameters becomes infeasible
meaning that no physical states can satisfy the con-
straints that are imposed by observed statistics. This is
a somehow surprising observation since many previous
security analyses (e.g. [5, 6, 10, 31]) assume dark counts
to be untrusted but did not encounter any issue with in-
feasible constraints. Most of these analyses use coarse-
grained statistics (e.g. bit/phase error rate) to bound
Eve’s knowledge. However, the use of refined statistics
in our SDP constraints poses more stringent conditions
on the feasible set which makes it less robust against in-
feasibility issues. Therefore, at least when infeasibility
is detected, we cannot outsource the dark counts simu-
lated by a classical noise model entirely to Eve as previ-
ous literature did. In the case of having infeasible data,
we allow the SDP numerical solver to relax the satisfi-
ability of constraints in the sense that we are enlarging
the search set to the degree where it is feasible. Due to
large constraint violations and a minimisation over an
enlarged search set, we expect the key rate lower bound
obtained by this method to be much lower than the true
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FIG. 3. (a) Our optimal lower bounds and (b) the correspond-
ing mean photon numbers for secure key rates per clock cycle
for both trusted (solid lines) and untrusted dark counts (dot-
ted lines) versus total transmissivity η. For clarity, we omit
labelling the lines for trusted and untrusted dark counts in the
cases where the two lines are indistinguishable.
value. As for the feasible cases, Fig. 3 shows that turning
dark counts from untrusted to trusted increases the key
rates. In the remaining of this section, if we make state-
ments about the key rates without mentioning whether
dark counts are trusted or untrusted, then the statement
applies to both cases.
In the design view of a QKD security analysis, the
goal is to optimise over all parameters and find the opti-
mal setting of the experimental setup. Here, we seek the
optimal asymmetric transmission parameter κ and the
corresponding optimal signal intensity |α|2 that gives
the highest key rate at different total transmissivity η.
We see that the smaller the value of κ, the lower the
key rates in Fig. 3(a) because Alice would need to send
more photons (as one can see from Fig. 3(b)) in order to
maintain an adequate proportion of middle-click detec-
tion events, which allow Bob to infer the relative phase
φx − φB. Therefore, one should always aim at reducing
the loss at the phase modulator in order to increase the
overall key rate.
To elaborate more on the optimality of the intensities
in Fig. 3(b), we point out the two competing factors for
9using more photons in the signal. First, sending higher
intensity signals causes more photons to pass through
Eve’s domain, which allows her to gain more informa-
tion about the signal, thereby reducing the key rate. Sec-
ond, as more information can be transmitted from Alice
to Bob via multi-photon signals, the key rate may in-
crease if the cost of error correction increases less than
the information gain by Eve.
These two factors pull the key rate into opposite direc-
tions, so there is an optimal point for the key rate to be
maximised, of which the corresponding optimal mean
photon number is shown in Fig. 3(b). These values ap-
pear to be higher than the optimal values for the key
rates in [6]. This indicates that some multi-photon sig-
nals carry useful information from Alice to Bob of which
Eve does not possess full knowledge, and hence favours
signals with higher intensity.
At this point, we would like to compare our results
with previous results in [5, 6] which both contain valid
secure proofs that make use of the single-photon com-
ponents only. Note that although the technical analysis
of [5] is correct, the conclusion that the key rate of the
unbalanced BB84 protocol will be overestimated if one
blindly uses the security analysis of a balanced protocol
is not. While [5] has shown that the key rate for unbal-
anced signals is lower than that for balanced ones, the
authors of [6] correctly point out that the drop in key
rate is due to a smaller success rate of the unbalanced
protocol, followed by the same key reduction during
privacy amplification as for a balanced protocol. So in
effect, during the operation of an unbalanced protocol,
the use of privacy amplification terms from a balanced
BB84 protocol still gives valid secret key rates. There-
fore, it is incorrect for Ref. [5] to conclude that the drop
in secure key rates for the unbalanced cases is due to
the application of a new security analysis. Since Ref. [6]
provides a known analytical key rate of this scenario,
we use that result as the baseline of our investigations
to show that in fact the secret key rate is underestimated
by this security analysis, and thus less privacy amplifi-
cation is required in this situation.
We compare our key rates with [6]’s in Fig. 4, which
shows that our analysis provides higher key rates for
total transmissivity η > 0.1 (<10 dB), especially for
small κ values. Our method shows advantage in low-
loss cases because the PA components from the multi-
photon part of Alice’s signals are larger in the low-loss
regime, which are pessimistically set to zero in [6]. This
can be understood as Eve does not learn too much of
the multi-photon signals, thereby allowing more infor-
mation to reach Bob.
When the total transmissivity satisfies η ≤ 0.2, we en-
counter the issue with SDP infeasibility with untrusted
dark counts. We recover approximately the same key
rates in [6] for most cases, but some of our lower bounds
for the key rates (obtained from maximising the dual
SDP problem) in the untrusted noise scenario appear
to be slightly lower than [6]’s. To understand the gaps
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FIG. 4. Percentage change in key rates comparing our opti-
mal lower bounds for key rates with [6]’s optimal key rates
versus total transmissivity η. We label the changes for trusted
(untrusted) dark counts with solid (dotted) lines. A positive
change means that our key rate is higher.
between our key rate upper bounds (which are on par
with [6]’s key rates) and lower bounds (see Sec. IV D
for the meaning of the two bounds), we recall that our
way of getting around the infeasibility issue with un-
trusted noise is to relax the required precision for the
constraints to be satisfied in the numerical solver. The
primal suboptimal solution to the relaxed problem will
naturally suffer from stronger SDP constraint violations
which lead to a larger penalty term in the calculation of
the dual suboptimal solution [16].
Notice that when the asymmetric loss parameter
reaches κ = 0.3, the percentage increase of our key
rate relative to [6]’s is the least compared to other val-
ues of κ. This phenomenon is also observed when we
make the following choices of parameters: flag-state
photon cutoff NB ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, dark count probability
pd ∈ {0, 10−5, 10−4}, and total transmissivity η = 1. As
our numerical data suggest, the ratio between the opti-
mal values of the privacy amplification terms attributed
to Alice sending out 1-photon and 2-photon signals,
r21 =
minρ2AB∈S2 D(G(ρ
2
AB)||Z(G(ρ2AB)))
minρ1AB∈S1 D(G(ρ
1
AB)||Z(G(ρ1AB)))
, (40)
reaches its smallest value when κ ≈ 0.3. This can be in-
terpreted as the amount of private information carried
by 2-photon signals relative to the amount carried by
1-photon signals is the least when κ ≈ 0.3. Note that
the ratio r21 hits minimum when κ ≈ 0.3, which cor-
responds to the points with the least key rate improve-
ment.
As a remark, the optimal signal intensities |α˜opt|2’s for
[6]’s optimal key rates (corresponding to Eqn. (6) in [6]),
which we compare with in Fig. 4, are slowly decreas-
ing as η increases. They satisfy |α˜opt|2 ≤ min{1, |αopt|2}
where |αopt|2 is the corresponding optimal intensity of
our analysis as plotted in Fig. 3(b). This means that [6]’s
10
optimal signal intensity is always smaller than our op-
timal intensity |αopt|2. It is also true that [6]’s optimal
intensity increases as κ reduces for all tested values of η.
In the post-processing view, the goal is to determine
the amount of key reduction from privacy amplification
that guarantees a secure final key for a given set of ex-
perimental parameters. Particularly, in the case where
the attenuation of the laser has already been set to [6]’s
optimal intensity for a chosen set of parameters, we
compare the privacy amplification term from our analy-
sis with the one from [6]’s. To see this, we first show in
Fig. 5 that our method still gives higher key rates than
[6]’s in the low-loss regime (η > 0.15) even when our
signal intensities are set to [6]’s. We then make the con-
nection between this result and the difference in privacy
amplification with two observations: 1) the probability
of passing post-selection ppass is equal for both methods
and 2) the costs of error correction are approximately
equal when the same signal intensity is used in both ap-
proaches. It follows that the difference in key rates trans-
lates to the difference in the privacy amplification terms
in the key rate formula. Thus, our method requires less
key reduction from privacy amplification compared to
[6] for low-loss scenarios. This allows us to extract more
secret key out of these unbalanced protocols than previ-
ously thought.
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FIG. 5. Percentage change in key rates comparing our lower
bounds for key rates per clock cycle evaluated at [6]’s optimal
αopt with [6]’s optimal key rates versus total transmissivity η.
We label the changes for trusted (untrusted) dark counts with
solid (dotted) lines. A positive change means that our key rate
is higher.
We now turn to study the effect of trusted loss on
the key rates. Previously, we assume that the quantum
channel contributes completely to the total loss. How-
ever, if we know that a certain part of the total loss is
caused by some trusted components (e.g. Bob’s detec-
tors), the key rate can be improved since the channel loss
is effectively smaller. The key rate improvement has al-
ready been shown in both active and passive BB84 pro-
tocol [17] where the detection efficiency of the receiver’s
detectors is assumed to be beyond Eve’s control. We will
present a similar behaviour of the key rates of this pro-
tocol under different trusted loss conditions.
We fix the total transmissivity to be η = 0.1 and as-
sume dark counts to be trusted, and then we vary the
detection efficiency of Bob’s trusted detectors ηdet. In-
deed, Fig. 6(a) shows that the lower bound of our opti-
mal key rate increases with the proportion of the trusted
loss component coming from Bob’s detectors to the to-
tal loss, which takes the form 1−ηdet1−η . The optimal mean
photon numbers corresponding to the optimal key rates
are displayed in Fig. 6(b).
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FIG. 6. Assuming trusted dark counts, (a) our lower bounds
for key rates and (b) the mean photon numbers plotted against
the proportion (in percentage) of the trusted loss coming from
the detection inefficiency of Bob’s detectors to a fixed total loss
corresponding to total transmissivity η = 0.1.
To summarise this section, we report a significant
gain in key rates in the low-loss regime (≤10 dB) with
our analysis. To be precise, with our security analy-
sis, higher key rates can be obtained when the signal
intensities are set to our optimal and [6]’s optimal val-
ues. We emphasise that the reported improvement can
be attained without any modification to the experimen-
tal setup. Lastly, we show that the key rates can be in-
creased if we know that the detection inefficiency con-
tributes a considerable amount to the total loss.
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VII. SUMMARY & OUTLOOK
This work provides a new numerical security proof
for the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84 protocol. Us-
ing the newly developed flag-state squashing model
[17], we are able to derive additional private informa-
tion from the multi-photon components of the signal
states. We compare our key rates with the key rates
proved in Ref. [6] under the same simulation parame-
ters and show that our analysis results in significantly
higher key rates in the low-loss regime. In the design
view, we find that a balanced protocol (κ = 1) gives a
higher key rate than an unbalanced protocol so that a
design cannot take advantage of an artificial induction
of asymmetry. In the post-processing view, our method
requires less key reduction from privacy amplification
compared to [6] for low-loss cases. We prove that our
key rates are still better than [6]’s even when their op-
timal mean signal photon numbers are used. Hence,
any experiments that are already implementing the op-
timal settings of [6] can profit from our higher key rates.
We also explore the advantage of characterising the re-
ceiver’s detection inefficiency as a trusted loss, which is
not allowed by [5, 6]’s proof technique. Our results sug-
gest that the key rate can be improved when the propor-
tion of trusted loss due to detection inefficiency to the
total loss is significant.
Let us conclude by pointing out some future direc-
tions of investigations: It is important to find a for-
mal way of incorporating untrusted dark counts into
the security analysis without leading to unphysical con-
straints. As mentioned in Sec. IV B, to extend our anal-
ysis to the use of a finite number of decoy states, one
must consider the dependence among different feasible
conditional state sets when handling the privacy ampli-
fication term. Finally, some of our proof techniques can
be transferred to a finite-key analysis. It would be worth
comparing the key rates from a finite-key analysis with
the asymptotic key rates reported here.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the lower bound for the weight
of (n ≤ NB)-photon signal subspace
We aim at lower bounding the weight of the (n ≤
NB)-photon signal subspace, p(n≤NB), with Bob’s ob-
served statistics. In this Appendix, we use the cross-
click probability to derive a lower bound for p(n≤NB) in
the following steps. The cross-click probability for any
signal satisfies
p(cc) =
NB
∑
n=0
p(n)p(cc|n) +
∞
∑
n=NB+1
p(n)p(cc|n)
≥
NB
∑
n=0
p(n)pmin(cc|n) +
∞
∑
n=NB+1
p(n)pmin(cc|n)
≥ p(n ≤ NB)Cminn≤NB + [1− p(n ≤ NB)]Cminn>NB
= Cminn>NB − p(n ≤ NB)(Cminn>NB − Cminn≤NB). (A1)
In the second line, pmin(cc|n) denotes the minimal
cross-click probability given that Bob receives an n-
photon signal. In the last two lines, we define p(n≤
NB) := ∑
NB
n=0 p(n), C
min
n≤NB := min0≤n≤NB pmin(cc|n) and
Cminn>NB := minn>NB pmin(cc|n). If pmin(cc|n) is monoton-
ically increasing with n, then Cminn≤NB = pmin(cc|0) and
Cminn>NB = pmin(cc|NB + 1). If we also have strict inequal-
ity Cminn>NB > C
min
n≤NB , then we can turn the inequality in
(A1) into the desired lower bound
p(n ≤ NB) ≥ 1− p(cc)− pmin(cc|0)pmin(cc|NB + 1)− pmin(cc|0) =: B
min
n≤NB .
(A2)
We will show that the minimum cross-click probabilities
indeed satisfy the monotonicity and the strict inequality
conditions.
To obtain the minimum conditional probabilities
pmin(cc|0) and pmin(cc|NB + 1), we start by considering
the new POVM elements after classical post-processing
due to dark counts as mentioned in Sec. III C which are
PφB0 = (1− pd)6 FφB0 , (A3)
PφBt1 = (1− pd)4(F
φB
t1 + (1− (1− pd)2)F
φB
0 ), (A4)
PφBt3 = (1− pd)4(F
φB
t3 + (1− (1− pd)2)F
φB
0 ), (A5)
PφB2 = (1− pd)5(FφB2 + pd FφB0 ), (A6)
PφB5 = (1− pd)5(FφB5 + pd FφB0 ), (A7)
PφBt1,t3 = (1− pd)2{F
φB
t1,t3 + [1− (1− pd)2](F
φB
t1 + F
φB
t3 )
+ [1− (1− pd)2]2 FφB0 }, (A8)
PφB2,5 = (1− pd)4[FφB2,5 + pd(FφB2 + FφB5 ) + p2d FφB0 ]. (A9)
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We first group the pre-processed POVM elements into
two coarse-grained POVM elements: outside-only (t1,
t3, t1&t3) and inside-only (2, 5, 2&5). Using Eqns. (19)
and (20), the two elements can be expressed as
Fout = ∑
φB∈{0,pi/2}
(FφBt1,t3 + F
φB
t1 + F
φB
t3 )
=
∞
∑
n=1
n
∑
i=0
ξ i(1− ξ)n−i|i, n− i〉〈i, n− i|, (A10)
Fin = ∑
φB∈{0,pi/2}
(FφB2,5 + F
φB
2 + F
φB
5 )
=
∞
∑
n=1
n
∑
i=0
ξn−i(1− ξ)i|i, n− i〉〈i, n− i|. (A11)
Similarly, the two coarse-grained post-processed POVM
elements can be found to be
Pout = ∑
φB∈{0,pi/2}
(PφBt1,t3 + P
φB
t1 + P
φB
t3 )
= (1− pd)2{Fout + [1− (1− pd)4]F0}, (A12)
Pin = ∑
φB∈{0,pi/2}
(PφB2,5 + P
φB
2 + P
φB
5 )
= (1− pd)4{Fin + pd(2− pd)F0}, (A13)
where the pre-processed no-click POVM element is F0 =
|0, 0〉〈0, 0|. Therefore, the post-processed coarse-grained
POVM elements for inside-only and outside-only clicks
are diagonal in the two-mode Fock basis {|i, n− i〉 : i =
0, ..., n} for all n ∈N. The cross-click POVM element is
Pcc = 1B − (Pout + Pin +∑
φB
PφB0 ) (A14)
which is also diagonal in the two-mode Fock basis. Since
Pcc is already diagonal, it is straightforward to find Pcc’s
minimum eigenvalue restricted to the n-photon sub-
space, which corresponds to the minimum cross-click
probability for any n-photon input states, analytically.
For an eigenstate |i, n − i〉, the associated cross-click
probability (the eigenvalue of Pcc) can be found using
Eqns. (A3) – (A14) as
p(cc| |i, n− i〉) = 1− (1− pd)2 ξ i(1− ξ)n−i
− (1− pd)4 ξn−i(1− ξ)i (A15)
for n ≥ 1, and for the vacuum state |0, 0〉 to be
p(cc|0) = 1− (1− pd)2[1+ pd (1− pd)2(2− pd)]
as stated in Eqn. (28). Since there is only one eigen-
value in the vacuum subspace, we need not minimise
the conditional probability (i.e. pmin(cc|0) = p(cc|0)).
We exclude the case where the phase modulator has zero
transmissivity (κ = 0), then ξ = 11+κ ∈ [ 12 , 1), so the min-
imum cross-click probability for any (n ≥ 1)-photon in-
put state is
pmin(cc|n) = 1− (1− pd)2 ξn − (1− pd)4 (1− ξ)n
as stated in Eqn. (29), which is valid for photon number
n ≥ 1. Notice that pmin(cc|n) is monotonically increas-
ing with n which agrees with our intuition that cross-
click events are likely with more incoming photons.
As we further restrict the dark count probability to
pd ∈ [0, 1), it is analytically straightforward to verify
that for all n ≥ 1 and ξ ∈ [ 12 , 1),
p(cc|0) ≤ pmin(cc|n) < pmin(cc|n + 1), (A16)
so the monotonicity and the strict inequality conditions
for (A2) to hold are satisfied. The inequality (A2) is of
the same form as (27) in Sec. IV A except that the ob-
served cross-click probability in (27) is conditioned on
Alice’s signal choice x.
We now move on to prove that the lower bound in the
inequality (A2) is tighter than the lower bound derived
in Ref. [14] for no dark counts. We use the fact that
a− c
b− c ≤
a
b
, if 0 ≤ c ≤ a ≤ b (A17)
and all probabilities are positive to show that
p(cc)− p(cc|0)
pmin(cc|NB + 1)− p(cc|0) ≤
p(cc)
pmin(cc|NB + 1) . (A18)
With (29), we can further show that
pmin(cc|NB + 1) ≥ 1− ξNB+1 − (1− ξ)NB+1 . (A19)
Thus, the lower bound in (A2) is larger than the lower
bound derived in Ref. [14] which is the expression in
(29) for zero dark-count rate as in
p(n ≤ NB) ≥ Bminn≤NB ≥ 1−
p(cc)
1− ξNB+1 − (1− ξ)NB+1 .
(A20)
The secure key rate should only reduce as we loosen
the lower bound for the (n≤NB)-photon subspace since
the flag-state squashing map can be more entanglement-
breaking and so Eve could gain more information from
purification. As a result, we can use the dark-count-free
lower bound blindly on Bob’s measurement data to ob-
tain a secure key rate even if the dark-count rate is as-
sumed to be zero.
Appendix B: Proof of Decomposing the Privacy
Amplification term
In Sec. III B, Eqns. (8), (11) and (12) together describe
the entangled pure state that Alice prepares to be
|Ψ〉AAS A′ =∑
x
√
px |x〉A ⊗
∞
∑
n˜=0
√
pn˜ |n˜〉AS ⊗ |sxn˜〉A′
where we simplify the notation here with pn˜ := pn˜( α√ξ ).
Since the phase-randomised coherent signal states are
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block-diagonal in total photon number basis in Eve’s
point of view, Eve can, without loss of generality, per-
form QND measurements to determine the total photon
number in the signal states. This allows her to keep an
extra classical register that tells her the total number of
photons in the signal without degrading her eavesdrop-
ping power as we will see below.
To see why allowing Eve to measure the total photon
number in the signal state will not affect our security
statement, we first consider the most general scenario
where we do not assume anything about Eve’s attack.
By Stinespring’s dilation theorem, the action of a quan-
tum channel on the signal state can be described by an
isometry VA′→BE that takes Alice’s signal system, A′, to
Bob’s system, B, and Eve’s purifying system, E, such
that the pure state shared among all parties is
|Ψ˜〉AASBE =∑
x
√
px |x〉A⊗
∞
∑
n˜=0
√
pn˜ |n˜〉AS ⊗VA′→BE |sxn˜〉A′ .
Eve’s general reduced state conditioned on Alice’s mea-
surement outcome x is
ρxE =
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ TrB(VA′→BE |sxn˜〉〈sxn˜| V†A′→BE). (B1)
In the alternative scenario, we assume that Eve per-
forms the QND measurement and could perform adap-
tive attack according to her knowledge of the photon
number. Let Eve’s purifying system of the signal be E
and the extra register for recording the photon number
in Alice’s signal be E˜. Again by Stinespring’s dilation
theorem, one can describe the action of a quantum chan-
nel on the signal state by an isometry VA′→BEE˜ which
takes the form
VA′→BEE˜ =
∞
∑
n˜=0
V n˜A′→BE Π
A′
n˜ ⊗ |n˜〉E˜ (B2)
where V n˜A′→BE is Eve’s isometry for purifying Bob’s
quantum state given that she learns the total photon
number n˜ and ΠA
′
n˜ is a projector which projects onto the
n˜-total photon subspace of the signal system A′. The
shared pure state between Alice, Bob and Eve before any
announcements is
|Ψ〉AASBEE˜ =∑x
√
px |x〉A ⊗
∞
∑
n˜=0
√
pn˜ |n˜〉AS ⊗V n˜A′→BE |sxn˜〉A′ ⊗ |n˜〉E˜ (B3)
and Eve’s reduced state conditioned on Alice’s measure-
ment outcome x is
ρxEE˜ =
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ TrB[V
n˜
A′→BE |sxn˜〉〈sxn˜| (V n˜A′→BE)†]⊗|n˜〉〈n˜|E˜ .
(B4)
If we further trace out Eve’s register E˜, her reduced state
ρxE clearly contains the general attack in (B1) where Eve
performs the same purification (i.e. V n˜A′→BE = VA′→BE)
for all n˜ ∈ N. Therefore, the assumption that Eve can
measure the photon number of the signal and the pure
state shared by all parties to be (B3) will not affect the
security statement of our proof.
To decompose the relative entropy in Eqn. (31), we
can assume the pure state shared by all parties to be (B3)
as argued above. Hence, the state shared by Alice and
Bob is
ρAASB =∑
x,y
√
px py |x〉〈y|A⊗
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ |n˜〉〈n˜|AS ⊗Φ(|sxn˜〉〈s
y
n˜|),
(B5)
where the quantum channel between Alice and Bob is
defined as Φ(·) := TrE(VA′→BE · V†A′→BE). If we re-
order the positions of the three registers in the ten-
sor product and define the conditional state ρn˜AB =
∑x,y
√px py |x〉〈y|A ⊗ Φ(|sxn˜〉〈s
y
n˜|), the state in (B5) can
be expressed as
ρAASB =
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ |n˜〉〈n˜|AS ⊗ ρn˜AB . (B6)
We will utilise this block-diagonal structure to decom-
pose the relative entropy D(G(ρAASB)||Z(G(ρAASB))) in
the following steps.
According to the definitions of G and Z maps stated
in Eqns. (32) – (35), both maps act trivially on Al-
ice’s shield system AS (i.e. apply 1AS to the input
state). Hence, the unnormalised states G(ρAASB) andZ(G(ρAASB)) are also block-diagonal as in
N (ρAASB) =
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ |n˜〉〈n˜|AS ⊗N (ρn˜AB) (B7)
for N to be the substitute for the maps G and Z ◦ G.
Taking the matrix logarithm gives us
logN (ρAASB) =
∞
∑
n˜=0
|n˜〉〈n˜|AS ⊗ [(log pn˜)1+ logN (ρn˜AB)].
(B8)
By the definition of relative entropy, we decompose the
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PA term into
D(G(ρAASB)||Z(G(ρAASB)))
=Tr{G(ρAASB)
[
logG(ρAASB)− logZ(G(ρAASB))
]}
=
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ Tr{G(ρn˜AB)
[
logG(ρn˜AB)− logZ(G(ρn˜AB)
]
}
=
∞
∑
n˜=0
pn˜ D(G(ρn˜AB)||Z(G(ρn˜AB))), (B9)
which completes the proof.
Appendix C: Justifications for speeding up SDP
optimisations
1. Reducing the number of variables in SDP
To speed up the convex optimisation for the SDP
problem specified in (39), we make use of the structure
of the flag-state squashed state. The joint state shared
between Alice and Bob ρAB can be expressed as
ρAB =
dA
∑
i,j=1
∞
∑
n,m=1
ρn,mi,j Ei,j ⊗ En,m , (C1)
where Ei,j = |i〉〈j| with {|i〉} being an orthonormal ba-
sis and ρn,mi,j ∈ C ∀ i, j, k, l, n, m. Recall that the flag-state
squashing map takes the form of (25) and since the di-
mension of the 2-mode (n ≤ NB)-photon subspace is
Tr(Πn≤NB) =
(NB+1)(NB+2)
2 , the joint state after squash-
ing can be written as
ρ˜AB = (1A ⊗Λ)ρAB
=
dA
∑
i,j=1
∞
∑
n,m=1
ρn,mi,j Ei,j ⊗Λ(En,m)
=
dA
∑
i,j=1
Ei,j ⊗
Tr(Πn≤NB )∑
n,m=1
ρn,mi,j En,m +
MB
∑
k=1
cki,jE˜k,k

(C2)
= (1A ⊗Πn≤NB)ρAB(1A ⊗Πn≤NB) (C3)
+
MB
∑
k=1
(
dA
∑
i=1
cki,iEi,i +
dA
∑
i<j
cki,jEi,j + (c
k
i,j)
∗Ej,i
)
⊗ E˜k,k
where we define E˜k,l = ETr(Πn≤NB )+k, Tr(Πn≤NB )+l , c
k
i,j =
Tr[Pk (∑∞n,m=Tr(Πn≤NB )+1
ρn,mi,j En,m)], and MB to be the
number of POVM elements. Since ρAB is Hermitian, we
also know that
(ρn,mi,j )
∗ = ρm,nj,i and (c
k
i,j)
∗ = ckj,i . (C4)
Therefore, we only have to optimize over
(dA Tr(Πn≤NB))
2 + d2A ×MB real parameters instead of
[dA(Tr(Πn≤NB) + MB)]
2 real parameters if we simply
take the squashed state as a dA(Tr(Πn≤NB) + MB)-
dimensional density matrix before imposing any SDP
constraints. By reducing the number of parameters,
we observe significant speedup in the optimisation (for
dA = 4 and MB = 28).
2. Speedup in checking constraints
In the SDP optimisation problem (39), to impose each
of the SDP constraints require explicit evaluation of the
inner product between the updated squashed state ρ
and each constraint matrix Γµ. As the squashed state
and all the constraint matrices in (39) admit a block-
diagonal structure, we only need to consider the matrix
elements of ρ and {Γµ} that are contained in these blocks
to calculate the inner product. We will show that by
defining new optimisation variables of smaller dimen-
sions, the SDP problem (39) can be restructured so that
each constraint can be checked faster. By doing so, the
SDP optimisation problem can be solved quicker.
Let Γ be a squashed constraint matrix, which is Her-
mitian and can be expressed in the squashed basis as
Γ =
dA
∑
i,j=1
Ei,j ⊗
Tr(Πn≤NB )∑
n,m=1
Γn,mi,j En,m +
MB
∑
k,l=1
Γk,li,j E˜k,l

(C5)
where Γn,mi,j ∈ C, and satisfy (Γn,mi,j )∗ = Γm,nj,i ∀ i, j, n, m.
We can split Tr(Γρ˜AB) into three terms as in
Tr(Γρ˜AB) =
dA
∑
i,j=1
Tr(Πn≤NB )∑
n,m=1
Γn,mi,j ρ
m,n
j,i +
MB
∑
k=1
Γk,ki,j c
k
j,i

= Tr(Γρn≤NB) + 〈~Γflag|~cdiag〉+ 2Re(〈~Γflag|~coff〉),
(C6)
where we define ρn≤NB = (1A ⊗ Πn≤NB) ρAB (1A ⊗
Πn≤NB), |~Γflag〉 = ∑dAi,j=1 ∑MBk=1 Γk,ki,j |i〉 ⊗ |j〉 ⊗ |k〉, |~cdiag〉 =
∑dAi=1 ∑
MB
k=1 c
k
i,i|i〉⊗ |i〉⊗ |k〉 and |~coff〉 = ∑dAi<j ∑MBk=1 cki,j|i〉⊗
|j〉 ⊗ |k〉. The expression (C6) requires much fewer cal-
culations in tracing the matrix product in the flag-state
subspace (i.e. span{E˜k,l}).
Define a function R(σ) = D(G(σ)||Z(G(σ))) and an
operator-valued functionM which maps ρn≤NB , |~cdiag〉
and |~coff〉 to the density matrix ρ˜AB of the form in
(C3) where the coefficients can be retrieved from cki,i =
〈i, i, k|~cdiag〉 and cki,j = 〈i, j, k|~coff〉 with |i, j, k〉 := |i〉 ⊗
15
|j〉 ⊗ |k〉. The SDP problem can be restructured into
minimise R
(
M
(
ρn≤NB , |~cdiag〉, |~coff〉
))
subject to
Tr(Γµ ρn≤NB) + 〈~Γµ,flag|~cdiag〉+ 2Re(〈~Γµ,flag|~coff〉) = γµ ,
Tr(Γ˜ν ρn≤NB) + 〈~˜Γν,flag|~cdiag〉+ 2Re(〈~˜Γν,flag|~coff〉) ≥ γ˜ν ,
M
(
ρn≤NB , |~cdiag〉, |~coff〉
)
≥ 0, (C7)
where the free variables for the numerical optimisation
are ρn≤NB ∈ D(CdATr(Πn≤NB )), |~cdiag〉 ∈ RdA MB , and
|~coff〉 ∈ CdA(dA−1)MB/2.
Since the equality and inequality constraints (133 con-
straints in (39)) have to be checked for each run of the
SDP optimisation, reducing the time and memory used
in matrix multiplications of {Γµ} (and {Γ˜ν}) with the
squashed state ρ˜AB substantially improves the runtime
of the whole key rate calculation.
3. Speedup in evaluating D(G(ρAB)||Z(G(ρAB)))
Recall the definitions of the G and Z maps as stated in
Eqns. (32) – (35). Using the form of the shared state ρAB
specified in Eqn. (C2) with i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and MB =
28, the state G(ρAB) can be expanded into
G(ρAB) =
[
(|0〉〈0|R ⊗ EA0,0)⊗ σ0,0
+ (|0〉〈1|R ⊗ EA0,2)⊗ σ0,2
+ (|1〉〈0|R ⊗ EA2,0)⊗ σ2,0
+ (|1〉〈1|R ⊗ EA2,2)⊗ σ2,2
]
⊗ |0〉〈0|B˜
+
[
(|0〉〈0|R ⊗ EA1,1)⊗ σ1,1
+ (|0〉〈1|R ⊗ EA1,3)⊗ σ1,3
+ (|1〉〈0|R ⊗ EA3,1)⊗ σ3,1
+ (|1〉〈1|R ⊗ EA3,3)⊗ σ3,3
]
⊗ |1〉〈1|B˜ , (C8)
where σi,j := F Bα(i)
(
∑
Tr(Πn≤NB )
n,m=1 ρ
n,m
i,j En,m
)
F B
α(i) +
F B
α(i)
(
∑28k=1 c
k
i,jE˜k,k
)
FB
α(i) with α(i) = i mod 2. Apply
the Z map to G(ρAB) will get
Z(G(ρAB)) =
[
(|0〉〈0|R ⊗ EA0,0)⊗ σ0,0
+ (|1〉〈1|R ⊗ EA2,2)⊗ σ2,2
]
⊗ |0〉〈0|B˜
+
[
(|0〉〈0|R ⊗ EA1,1)⊗ σ1,1
+ (|1〉〈1|R ⊗ EA3,3)⊗ σ3,3
]
⊗ |1〉〈1|B˜ . (C9)
Since Bob’s basis announcement partitions G(ρAB)
into 2 orthogonal subspaces with the orthogonal projec-
tions and his quantum system B is further partitioned
into 2 orthogonal subspaces (i.e. (n≤NB)-photon sub-
space and the flag-state subspace), G(ρAB) as shown in
Eqn. (C8) can be broken down into 4 orthogonal sub-
spaces.
Restricting to the image of map G, matrices G(ρAB)
and Z(G(ρAB)) can be simplified to
G(ρAB) =
σ0,0 σ0,2 0 0σ2,0 σ2,2 0 00 0 σ1,1 σ1,3
0 0 σ1,3 σ3,3
 , (C10)
Z(G(ρAB)) =
σ0,0 0 0 00 σ2,2 0 00 0 σ1,1 0
0 0 0 σ3,3
 . (C11)
Recall the definition of relative entropy: D(ρ||σ) =
Tr(ρ log ρ) − Tr(ρ log σ), which is finite if ker(σ) ⊆
ker(ρ). We can restrict to non-zero subspaces and ex-
press the objective function as in Eqn. (C14) below.
Tr(G(ρAB) logG(ρAB)) (C12)
=
1
∑
i=0
[
Tr
(
τn≤NBi log τ
n≤NB
i
)
+ Tr
(
τ
flag
i log τ
flag
i
)]
,
Tr(G(ρAB) logZ(G(ρAB))) (C13)
=
1
∑
i=0
[
Tr
(
τn≤NBi logP(τn≤NBi )
)
+ Tr
(
τ
flag
i logP(τ
flag
i )
)]
,
D(G(ρAB)||Z(G(ρAB))) (C14)
=
1
∑
i=0
[
D
(
τn≤NBi ||P(τn≤NBi )
)
+ D
(
τ
flag
i ||P(τ
flag
i )
)]
,
τ
β
i :=
(
σ
β
i,i σ
β
i,i+2
σ
β
i+2,i σ
β
i+2,i+2
)
, P(τβi ) :=
(
σ
β
i,i 0
0 σβi+2,i+2
)
with β ∈ {n ≤ NB, flag}, where we define the matrices
σn≤NBi,j := F Bα(i)
(
∑
Tr(Πn≤NB )
n,m=1 ρ
n,m
i,j En,m
)
FB
α(i) and σ
flag
i,j :=
F B
α(i)
(
∑28k=1 c
k
i,jE˜k,k
)
FB
α(i).
The objective function in (C14) only requires diago-
nalisation and the logarithms of the smaller matrices τβi
and P(τβi ) for i ∈ {0, 1} and β ∈ {n ≤ NB, flag}. There-
fore, the expression in (C14) can be computed much
quicker than if we simply calculate the relative entropy
with the full matrices G(ρAB) and Z(G(ρAB)).
4. Speedup in evaluating the perturbed objective function
In the step of linearising the SDP problem, the gradi-
ent of the objective function has to be evaluated at the
suboptimal point obtained from the first step [16]. As
pointed out in Sec. 3.2 of Ref. [16], the gradient is un-
defined if the matrix G(ρAB) is not full rank. Besides,
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due to the finite numerical precision of a computer, the
computed matrix G(ρAB) may have negative eigenval-
ues for which the objective function is undefined. In
these cases, we perform a perturbation on the matrix
G(ρAB) by applying a depolarising channel which gives
the perturbed map Ge(ρAB), as defined in [16],
Ge(ρAB) := (1− e)G(ρAB) + ed′ 1d′
= (1− e)G(ρAB) + ed′ 1|Im(G) +
e
d′ 1|ker(G) ,
(C15)
where e > 0 is the perturbation parameter and d′ =
dim(G(ρAB)). Applying the Z map to (C15) results in
Z(Ge(ρAB)) = (1− e)Z(G(ρAB))+ ed′ 1|Im(G)+
e
d′ 1|ker(G) .
(C16)
The new objective function D(Ge(ρAB)||Z(Ge(ρAB)))
is the relative entropy of the two perturbed matrices
(C15) and (C16). We now show that the evaluation of
the relative entropy can be restricted to the image of the
map G. We evaluate the matrix logarithms
logGe(ρAB) = log
[
(1− e)G(ρAB) + ed′ 1|Im(G)
]
+ log
( e
d′ 1|ker(G)
)
, (C17)
logZ(Ge(ρAB)) = log
[
(1− e)Z(G(ρAB)) + ed′ 1|Im(G)
]
+ log
( e
d′ 1|ker(G)
)
. (C18)
and define G˜e(ρAB) := ΠIm(G)Ge(ρAB)ΠIm(G) to obtain
D(Ge(ρAB)||Z(Ge(ρAB)))
=Tr{Ge(ρAB) [logGe(ρAB)− logZ(Ge(ρAB))]} (C19)
=Tr{G˜e(ρAB)[log G˜e(ρAB)− logZ(G˜e(ρAB))]} (C20)
=D(G˜e(ρAB)||Z(G˜e(ρAB))). (C21)
The step going from (C19) to (C20) comes from the fact
that Eqn. (C17) minus (C18) results in the zero opera-
tor in the kernel of map G. Now that we only have to
consider the image of G in (C21), we can use the decom-
position described in Eqn. (C14) but with the matrices
τ
β
i and P(τ
β
i ) replaced by τ˜
β
i and P(τ˜
β
i ) respectively,
which are defined as
τ˜
β
i := (1− e)τ
β
i +
e
d′ (1β ⊕ 1β), (C22)
P(τ˜βi ) := (1− e)P(τ
β
i ) +
e
d′ (1β ⊕ 1β) (C23)
with β ∈ {n ≤ NB, flag}. Since we can break down
the evaluation of the perturbed objective function into
calculations on restricted subspaces, the speedup de-
scribed in Appendix C 3 applies here.
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